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SUSPICIOUS SUSPECT CLASSES-ARE
NONIMMIGRANTS ENTITLED TO STRICT
SCRUTINY REVIEW UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE?: AN ANALYSIS OF
DANDAMUDI AND LECLERC
JOHN HARRAS'
INTRODUCTION
Aliens are treated as a suspect class-sometimes. As a
general rule, aliens are a suspect class, which makes any
statutory classification based on alienage subject to strict
scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Supreme Court has identified two exceptions
to that general rule. The first is the governmental function
exception. This exception permits courts to review statutes that
exclude aliens from governmental function occupations, such as
employment at police departments, under rational basis review.
The second exception concerns undocumented aliens. It allows
courts to review statutes that make classifications based on an
alien's undocumented status under rational basis review. Due to
a split of authority among circuit courts, there is an open
question as to whether nonimmigrants, aliens that are permitted
to reside in the United States on a temporary, conditional basis,
are a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny review. This Note
argues that nonimmigrants are not a suspect class and that,
therefore, the Supreme Court should recognize a third exception
to the general rule. This third exception would allow courts to
review statutes that make classifications based on an alien's
temporary status under rational basis review.
Nonimmigrants should not be treated as a suspect class
because nonimmigrants are not subject to the type of
discrimination that prompted the Supreme Court to announce
t J.D., 2015, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 2010, College
of William and Mary. I would very much like to thank Professor Margaret E.
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that aliens, in general, are a suspect class. The different
experiences of Torao Takahashi, an alien, and Catherine
Wallace, a nonimmigrant, exhibit the differences in the kind of
discrimination to which aliens used to be subject and the kind of
discrimination to which they are currently subjected.
Torao Takahashi was a Japanese immigrant trying to earn
an honest living as a fisherman in California.1 He left the Meiji
Emperor and Imperial Japan behind in 1907, likely in the hopes
of finding a better life in the land of freedom and democracy.2
His new country, however, did not treat him very kindly. After
lawfully living in the United States for thirty-five years, he was
forced from his home and confined to an internment camp during
World War II.3 By the time he returned home, California, acting
under the anti-Japanese fervor that permeated the state at that
time, enacted a law that denied fishing licenses to all Japanese
immigrants. Thus, because of anti-Japanese sentiment, Torao
Takahashi was dislocated, incarcerated, and deprived of his
livelihood as a fisherman.4
Caroline Wallace was a citizen of the United Kingdom and
was living temporarily in the United States under
"nonimmigrant alien[]" status, which means she was here
temporarily for a specific purpose.' Before coming to the United
States in 2001, she was an attorney in England and Wales,
having graduated from the College of Law in London with
distinction in 1998. 7 While in the United States, she worked as a
paralegal for the Capital Post Conviction Project of Louisiana.8
In December 2001, she applied for admission to the Louisiana
1 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 412 (1948).
2 See id.; Eiichiro Azuma, "Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development":
Japanese American History and the Making of Expansionist Orthodoxy in Imperial
Japan, 67 J. ASIAN STUD. 1187, 1192 (2008).
' See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 413; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
223 (1944).
4 See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 413; see also id. at 422 (Murphy, J., concurring)
("The statute in question is but one more manifestation of the anti-Japanese fever
which has been evident in California in varying degrees since the turn of the
century.").
Wallace v. Calogero, 286 F. Supp. 2d 748, 750-51 (E.D. La. 2003) (footnote
omitted), rev'd, LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005).
6 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15) (West 2014) (describing various employment-
related and other classifications under which aliens may be lawfully admitted into
the United States on a non-permanent basis).
Wallace, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
Id.
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Bar.9 In 2002, she was told that she was ineligible to take the
Louisiana Bar Examination because of her temporary status.10 If
she became a permanent legal resident, however, she could sit for
the exam.11
Are Torao Takahashi and Caroline Wallace's experiences
similar? Takahashi was the victim of xenophobia and racism.
He was denied a fishing license solely because he was Japanese-
a characteristic that in no way affected his ability to participate
in society. Can the same be said of Wallace? Her exclusion from
the Louisiana Bar did not appear to have been motivated by
racism or xenophobia but rather by her temporary immigration
status-a characteristic that, unlike her United Kingdom
background, may have affected her ability to participate in
society on an ongoing basis. Due to her temporary status, she
could have been forcibly expelled from the United States if her
visa was not renewed, and her application for permanent
residency was denied. As a result, her ability to participate in
society was more limited than that of a permanent resident.1 2
In Graham v. Richardson,3 the Supreme Court used
Takahashi's experience as a basis for holding alienage
classifications to be inherently suspect. 4 By labeling alienage
classifications inherently suspect, the Supreme Court ensured
that statutes that treated people like Takahashi differently than
everyone else would be reviewed under strict scrutiny, which is
the highest standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause and is also applied to statutes that make racial
classifications.15 The Court applied this level of scrutiny to
alienage classifications because it believed that "treating groups
differently based on the members' alienage was akin to
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See id.
12 This Note discusses, in detail, the reasons why temporary immigrants and
permanent immigrants are different, focusing on their ability to be professionals, in
Part III.
13 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
14 Id. at 372 ("[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny .... Accordingly, it was said in Takahashi that 'the power of a state to
apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within
narrow limits.'" (citations omitted) (citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410, 420 (1948))); see also Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2012).
" See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372; Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 73.
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discriminating against a group because of their race or color."16
This kind of discrimination is known as "invidious
discrimination.
Although the Graham Court stated that all alienage
classifications should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, the
Supreme Court has not always done so. The Supreme Court has
applied rational basis review, the lowest standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause, to many types of alienage
classifications where it has found a legitimate purpose for the
classification. For example, federal regulations affecting aliens;8
classifications excluding undocumented aliens from education;19
and laws excluding temporary aliens from voting,20 serving on a
jury,21 being police officers,22 or from serving as school teachers23
have all been subject to rational basis review.
From the cases that departed from the Graham rule, the
courts have developed two exceptions. The first exception is the
"governmental functions" exception, which allows courts to
review state laws that exclude aliens from performing a
"governmental function" under rational basis review.24 The
second exception allows courts to review statutes that exclude
undocumented aliens under rational basis review.25
Given the Supreme Court's willingness to depart from
Graham, the Second and Fifth Circuits have split on whether
statutes that exclude nonimmigrant aliens like Caroline Wallace
16 Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 73.
17 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause
requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute
constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The clear and central purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious
racial discrimination .... ); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 245 (1982) ("The Equal
Protection Clause protects against arbitrary and irrational classifications, and
against invidious discrimination stemming from prejudice and hostility.").
1" See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1976); see also Azizi v. Thornburgh,
908 F.2d 1130, 1133 (2d Cir. 1990).
19 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24.
20 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 648-49 (1973).
21 Foley, 435 U.S. at 296.
22 Id.
23 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979).
24 Id. at 74-75.
21 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-19 (1982); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66,
73-74 (2d Cir. 2012).
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should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. 2 The Fifth Circuit, in
LeClerc v. Webb,27 the case in which Caroline Wallace was a
plaintiff, found that nonimmigrants, like Wallace, were not a
suspect class and applied rational basis review to uphold the
statute that excluded nonimmigrants from taking the bar exam.28
In contrast, the Second Circuit, in Dandamudi v. Tisch,29 found
that nonimmigrants are a suspect class and applied strict
scrutiny to strike down a statute that excluded nonimmigrants
from obtaining a pharmacist's license.3
This Note argues that nonimmigrants are not a suspect class
and, therefore, statutes that restrict the rights of nonimmigrants
should be subject to rational basis review. This Note contends
that the Supreme Court did not intend alienage classification to
be inherently suspect unless the classification was motivated by
invidious discrimination. It argues that nonimmigrants are not
subject to invidious discrimination, since they are not victim to
discrimination based on an obvious, immutable characteristic
that has no affect on the alien's ability to participate in society-
something akin to skin color. Therefore, nonimmigrants are not
entitled to strict scrutiny review.
Part I of this Note provides the background necessary to
understand the different alienage classifications, equal protection
jurisprudence, and the confusion in the Supreme Court's alienage
equal protection precedent. Part II describes the differences of
opinion among the circuit courts on the application of the Equal
Protection Clause to nonimmigrants. Part III argues, in greater
detail, that nonimmigrants are not a suspect class for the reasons
stated above.
2' There is also a split of authority among circuit courts on whether the
Supremacy Clause preempts state statutes that exclude nonimmigrants from
working in a particular field. Compare LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 423 (5th Cir.
2005) ("Section 3(B) is unquestionably a permissible exercise of Louisiana's broad
police powers to regulate employment within its jurisidiction"), with Dandamudi,
686 F.3d at 81 (holding that federal immigration law preempts all state immigration
law). This Note focuses only on the equal protection analysis of each court. This
focus is warranted, as the Dandamudi court said "we must decide this case on Equal
Protection grounds." Id. at 81.
27 419 F.3d 405.
21 Id. at 419-22 ("By process of elimination, rational basis review must be the
appropriate standard for evaluating state law classifications affecting nonimmigrant
aliens."). The state law at issue excluded nonimmigrants from admission to the
Lousiana Bar. Id. at 410-11.
29 686 F.3d 66.
" Id. at 79.
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part first provides an overview of U.S. immigration law
by explaining the different alienage classifications and the
consequences of such classifications. It then provides a general
overview of equal protection jurisprudence by defining relevant
terms. Finally, this Part examines the Supreme Court's
precedent regarding the application of the Equal Protection
Clause to aliens.
A. Aren't Aliens from Mars?-Alienage Classifications Under
U.S. Immigration Law
The Immigration and Nationality Act (the "INA") defines an
"alien" as "any person not a citizen or national of the United
States."31  The INA distinguishes between two types of legal
aliens: lawful permanent residents ("LPRs")32  and
nonimmigrants.33 The following Subsections discuss each of
these alienage classifications.34
1. Lawful Permanent Residents ("LPRs")
LPR status has been described as "virtual citizenship. 35
Such status is only given after an investigation by the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services into the immigrant's
31 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(3)
(West 2014).
32 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(20) ("The term 'lawfully admitted fbr permanent
residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of
residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the
immigration laws, such status not having changed."). "[T]he Supreme Court has
used the terms 'resident alien,' 'permanent resident alien,' and 'immigrant' almost
interchangeably" for this type of alien. Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 58 n.4
(5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 110 (2012) (mem.) (citing LeClere, 419 F.3d at
410 n.2). Also, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services uses the terms
"Lawful Permanent Resident," "Permanent Resident Alien," "Resident Alien Permit
Holder," and "Green Card Holder" interchangeably. Lawful Permanent Resident
(LPR), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/
lawful-permanent-resident-lpr (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). This Note refers to such
aliens as lawful permanent residents ("LPRs").
33 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V) (specifying the different types of
nonimmigrants).
31 Undocumented aliens, also known as illegal aliens, constitute another alien
classification. The INA does not acknowledge them as a class of aliens but includes a
provision that prohibits their employment. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012). This Part does
not discuss undocumented aliens because the distinction between them and other
aliens is obvious-their presence is illegal and the others' presence is not.
31 Van Staden, 664 F.3d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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fitness for the "breadth of rights and responsibilities" possessed
by LPRs. These rights include the ability to live in the United
States permanently37 and to have "unrestricted authorization for
employment in the United States."3  A legal permanent
resident's resident alien card, also known as a "green card," is
sufficient for employment in any occupation of the resident's
choosing.39 LPRs are, generally speaking, entitled to federal
public benefits,40 which include Medicare and Social Security.41
LPRs may also choose to serve in the military. Regarding the
responsibilities of LPRs, they must pay the same taxes as U.S.
citizens43 and they must register for the selective service.4 4
2. Nonimmigrants
Nonimmigrants are aliens that are lawfully admitted into
the United States for a "specific and temporary" purpose.45
Unlike LPRs, they express no intention of abandoning their
foreign country residence.46 The INA describes over sixty types of
36 Id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012). However, LPRs can be deported if they commit
serious crimes, such as crimes of moral turpitude, drug abuse and addiction, and
failing to register as a sex offender. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (v), (B)(ii).
" Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433, 1445 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Richard D. Steel,
Rights of Permanent Residents, in STEEL ON IMMIGR. LAW § 10:8 (2d ed. 2012)
(showing that LPRs have general work authorization subject to a few exceptions).
" See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); Rights and Responsibilities of a Green
Card Holder (Permanent Resident), After a Green Card is Granted, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/after-green-card-granted/
rights- and-responsibilities-permanent-resident/rights- and-responsibiitiesgreen-
card-holder-permanent-resident (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
" Only "qualified alien[s]" are eligible for Federal public benefits. The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 401(a);
8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2012). A "qualified alien" includes LPRs but does not include
nonimmigrants or undocumented aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2012).
41 Federal public benefits include "any grant, contract, loan, professional license,
or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated
funds of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c)(1)(A). They also include "any
retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary
education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit." Id.
§ 1611(c)(1)(B).
42 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(B) (2012).
41 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 519, U.S. TAX
GUIDE FOR ALIENS 3, 10 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5l9.pdf.
44 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 435(a) (West 2014).
4' LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005).
46 Id. In every specified visa issued to a nonimmigrant, a condition to the visa is
"having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning."
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nonimmigrants,47 including aliens visiting the United States
temporarily,4" working in the United States temporarily,49 and
studying in the United States temporarily. °
Each type of nonimmigrant has a specific corresponding visa
authorizing the temporary stay. 1 The visa dictates the terms of
the nonimmigrant's stay.2 For example, if a nonimmigrant is
admitted to the United States on an H-1B visa, the
nonimmigrant is admitted for the purpose of performing services
in a "specialty occupation." 3 Such occupations require either a
bachelor's degree or higher, or a full state licensure 4 The
regulations promulgated under the INA specify the duration of
each visa. H-1B visa holders can legally remain and work in
the United States for only three years, 6 with the possibility of
one three-year extension. Most visas require prospective
employers to file a petition on a nonimmigrant's behalf before the
nonimmigrant can be employed. If a nonimmigrant fails to
comply with the terms of the visa, or if the visa expires, the
nonimmigrant may be deported. 9 A nonimmigrant, like a LPR,
may also be deported for committing a crime. 0
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(J) (West 2014); Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); see also
LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 410 n.3, 411 n.4.
47 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(2) (2015). Each
type of nonimmigrant is given its own visa. For example, an HI-B visa is for aliens.
See id. § 214.1(a)(1); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); Id. § 1184(i).
48 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (serving as the basis of a B-1 visa).
41 Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (serving as the basis of a temporary worker visa, such as
the HI-B visa).
5" Id. § 1101(a)(15)(J) (serving as the basis for a student visa, such as the J-1
visa).
51 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(2).
52 Id. § 214. 1(a)(3).
53 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).
54 Id. § 1184(i).
5 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (2015) (listing the requirements for each
category of nonimmigrants).
56 Id. § 214.2(h)(9)(iii)(A)(1).
57 Id. § 214.2(h)(15)(ii)(B).
51 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 214(c); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1184(c) (West
2014); Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers, Working in the United States, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, http ://www.uscis.gov/working-united-
states/temporary-workers/temporary-nonimmigrant-workers (last visited Mar. 22,
2015).
51 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2012).
6' Id. § 1227(a)(2).
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Generally speaking, nonimmigrants do not qualify for any
federal public benefits. 1 They are not required to register for the
Selective Service and they are prohibited from serving in the
military 2 because they do not owe "permanent allegiance to the
United States." 3  Most nonimmigrants are only taxed on their
U.S. income, whereas citizens and LPRs are taxed on their
worldwide income. 4
Thus, while nonimmigrants are subject to many more legal
restrictions than LPRs, they do not bear all of the same societal
responsibilities as LPRs and citizens.
B. The Equal Protection Clause-A General Overview
The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 165 The application of the Equal Protection
Clause has expanded significantly since the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Supreme Court first interpreted
the clause as only providing protection for African Americans
from the denial of equal protection under the law.67 Today, equal
61 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
12 See 10 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012).
63 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(22) (West 2014) (defining "national of the United States,"
which is a type of person that can enlist in the military under 10 U.S.C. § 504(a)).
64 U.S. TAX GUIDE FOR ALIENS, supra note 43. The IRS uses the green card test
and the substantial presence test to determine how an alien is taxed. Id. at 3-4.
Under the Green Card test, if you are a LPR, as defined in the INA,
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(20), then you are taxed the same way as a citizen is taxed. Id.
at 3. Under the substantial presence test, if you are physically present in the United
States for thiry-one days during 2013 and 183 days during the three-year time
period of 2011-2013, then you are also a resident for tax purposes in 2013, and are
taxed as a citizen. Id. at 4. If you are a H-1B temporary worker in the United States
for three years, as allowed under the regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(iii)(A)(1),
then you would be a nonimmigrant under the INA, but taxed as a citizen. Id. at 54.
6' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66 Introduction-Interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, in SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS & WOMEN'S RIGHTS (Clare Cushman ed., 2010), available at
http://supremecourthistory.org/lc womens rights.html.
67 In Strauder v. West Virginia, one of the first cases interpreting the Equal
Protection clause, the Supreme Court stated that the clause's purpose is to "secur[e]
to a race recently emancipated ... all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.
[Its] true spirit and meaning ... cannot be understood without keeping in view the
history of the times when [it was] adopted .. " 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (citation
omitted), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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protection applies to all classifications that treat persons who are
"similarly situated," differently. 8
Not all such classifications, however, are analyzed under the
same standard of review. The applicable standard of review
depends on whether the classification inhibits the exercise of a
fundamental right, or whether the classification discriminates
against a suspect class, a quasi-suspect class, or a non-suspect
class. 9 A fundamental right is one that is derived, either
explicitly or implicitly, from the Constitution itself.70 A suspect
class is a "discrete and insular minorit[y]" 71 that is "saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. '72  A suspect class typically
exhibits "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics
that define them as a discrete group,' 7 and this characteristic
"bears no relation to [the] ability to perform or contribute to
society. '74 The Supreme Court has said that classifications based
on alienage, nationality, and race are "inherently suspect. 75
Quasi-suspect classes have only been found in two contexts:
gender and legitimacy. 76 A non-suspect class is a class that fits
within neither of the other classes.77
"8 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)) ("The Equal Protection Clause ... is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.").
6 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
7 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.15.
71 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
,'more exacting judicial scrutiny" for legislation that affects "discrete and insular
minorities" who may not be able to rely on political processes ordinarily relied upon
to protect themselves).
72 Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
" Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
14 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (emphasis removed) (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
7 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
76 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
See id. at 441-42 (stating that the elderly constitute neither a suspect class
nor a quasi-suspect class, entitling them to no heightened review of statutes that
treat the elderly differently, making them a non-suspect class).
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If the classification inhibits the exercise of a fundamental
right or discriminates against a suspect class, courts apply strict
scrutiny to the classification.78 Strict scrutiny requires that the
classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.79 Many legal scholars view strict scrutiny as "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact,""° meaning that the application of strict
scrutiny often results in the statute at issue being held
unconstitutional.
A classification that discriminates against a quasi-suspect
class, such as gender or children born out of wedlock, is reviewed
under intermediate scrutiny. 1 Under this level of scrutiny, a
classification is only constitutional if it is "substantially related
to an important governmental objective.8 2 The outcome of this
standard's application is less predictable than that for the
application of strict scrutiny. 3 For example, under this standard
the Supreme Court held that excluding women from the Virginia
Military Institute is unconstitutional, 4 while discriminating
against women based on their pregnancy status is
constitutional. 5 Thus the application of intermediate scrutiny is
not as outcome determinative as the application of strict
scrutiny.
Non-suspect classifications are analyzed under rational basis
review. 6 This standard of review is "relatively relaxed" and
merely requires that the classification rationally further a
legitimate state purpose. 7 This purpose need not be explicitly
articulated by the state.8 A legitimate state purpose may be
ascertained by a court even when the legislative or
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982); Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72.
7S Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17.
80 E.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
"1 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
12 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) ("To withstand constitutional challenge ... classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.").
" See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996).
14 Id. at 534.
s Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974).
86 Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
87 Id. at 314.
88 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992).
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administrative history is silent.8 9 Moreover, the classification
need not be the best means of accomplishing the state purpose; it
just needs some rational relation to the purpose. 9  Finally,
classifications reviewed under rational basis scrutiny are
presumed to be valid. 91
C. Equal Protection and Alienage-The Supreme Court's
Precedent
The Court first applied equal protection to aliens in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,92 holding that the "[F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the
constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens ... [but
is] universal in [its] application[] to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race,
of color, or of nationality."93  In Yick Wo, a San Francisco
ordinance said that no laundry facility could be built or operated
within the city's limits without the consent of a municipal
board.94 The board only denied the applications of Chinese aliens
and only shut down laundry facilities that were owned by
Chinese aliens. 9 The Court found that no legitimate reason for
such discriminatory enforcement existed "except hostility to the
race and nationality to which the petitioners belong[ed] .'"9
Consequently, the Court held that the public administration of
the San Francisco ordinance violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,9" the Court
went further by holding that "the power of a state to apply its
laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined
within narrow limits."99  In Takahashi, a LPR of Japanese
" McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969)
("Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials
normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent,
and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be
conceived to justify them.").
o Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316.
91 Id. at 314.
92 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
9' Id. at 369.
9' Id. at 366.
9' Id. at 374.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
99 Id. at 420.
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descent was not allowed to renew his commercial fishing license
after he returned from his forced internment during World War
II.1°° His renewal was barred by a California statute that banned
the issuance of fishing licenses to any person ineligible for
citizenship."' The original draft of this statute, however,
prohibited the issuance of such licenses to any Japanese alien.1 °2
The language was changed from prohibiting the license to any
"alien Japanese" to any "person ineligible to citizenship" for fear
that the law would be ruled unconstitutional if it explicitly
targeted a specific race.0 3 The language change, however, did
not make a difference, as it was still ruled unconstitutional.0 4
The Court suggested that its ruling was based, at least in part,
on the notion that a state's ability to classify based on alienage
was particularly tenuous when the alienage classification
involved "certain racial and color groups. '"105
The Court first applied strict scrutiny review to alienage
classifications in Graham v. Richardson. °6 The Graham Court
was presented with an Arizona statute that denied welfare
benefits to all aliens that had not resided in the United States for
fifteen years and a Pennsylvania statute that denied welfare
benefits to all aliens.0 7 The Court reviewed these statutes under
strict scrutiny and held that they violated the Equal Protection
Clause.0 8 In reaching this conclusion, the Court not only relied
on the holdings of Yick Wo and Takahashi, but also on a
comparison of alienage to race and nationality.0 9 The Court
concluded that, like certain racial and nationality groups,
"[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
100 Id. at 413-14.
101 Id. at 413.
102 Id.
103 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Id. at 420-22.
10' Id. at 420.
106 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("[T]he Court's decisions have established that
classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a
prime example of a discrete and insular minority." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); id. at 376 ("The classifications involved in the instant cases ... are
inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny whether or not
a fundamental right is impaired.").
107 Id. at 367-68.
los Id. at 376.
109 Id. at 371-72.
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minority."11 Because of this similarity, the Court reasoned that
classifications based on alienage should be subject to the same
standard of review applied to racial classifications-strict
scrutiny."'
After Graham, the Court continued to review most, but not
all, classifications based on alienage under strict scrutiny. 2
Strict adherence to the Graham rule was first called into doubt in
Sugarman v. Dougall."3 Although the Sugarman Court struck
down a New York statute that excluded all aliens from holding
civil service positions by applying strict scrutiny, 4 it noted that
a state may exclude aliens from certain positions "where
citizenship bears some rational relationship to the special
demands of the particular position."1
The Supreme Court, since Sugarman, has applied rational
basis review-the lowest standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause-to certain types of alienage classifications,
giving rise to the governmental functions exception.1  For
example, in Foley v. Connelie,"7 the Supreme Court held that
"[i]t would be inappropriate... to require every statutory
exclusion of aliens to clear the high hurdle of 'strict scrutiny.' "118
The Foley Court reasoned that when dealing with matters firmly
within a state's constitutional prerogatives, the "[s]tate need only
justify its classification by a showing of some rational
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the
110 See id. at 372 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938)).
... See id. at 371-72.
112 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-23 (1973) (holding Connecticut's
exclusion of all aliens from admission to the Bar unconstitutional after applying
strict scrutiny to the statute); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1977) (holding
New York's conditioning of financial aid for higher education on being a citizen or
applying for citizenship unconstitutional after applying strict scrutiny). But see infra
notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
113 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973). The Graham rule was also not followed in Mathews
v. Diaz, where the Court upheld a federal statute that conditioned the eligibility for
participation in a federal medical insurance program on being a citizen or a LPR
who had lived in the United States for at least five years by declining to follow
Graham and applying a more deferential standard of review, though not explicitly
rational basis review. 426 U.S. 67, 69, 82-84 (1976).
114 Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642.
Id. at 647 (emphasis added) (quoting Dougall v. Sugarman, 339 F. Supp. 906,
911 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Lumbard, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11' See id. at 647.
117 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
11' Id. at 295.
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limiting classification."'119 Applying this standard of review, the
Foley Court upheld a New York statute that excluded all aliens
from becoming police officers, explaining that positions held by
those participating directly in the formulation, execution, or
review of public policy, like police officers, may rationally be
reserved for citizens in order to ensure that the people are
governed by their citizen peers.120 In Ambach v. Norwick,121 the
Court affirmed its reasoning in Foley and held constitutional a
New York statute that precludes aliens from becoming public
school teachers, stating that teaching fell within the
"governmental function" exception to applying strict scrutiny
that was alluded to by the Foley Court. 122 This exception to strict
scrutiny review also applies to statutes that exclude aliens from
serving on a jury and from voting.123  Thus the government
function exception allows courts to review statutes that exclude
aliens from government functions under rational basis review.
The Supreme Court has also applied a form of rational basis
review outside the governmental function context. In Plyler v.
Doe,124 the Court struck down a Texas statute that excluded the
children of undocumented aliens from receiving public
education. 12' The Court said that "[u]ndocumented aliens cannot
be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this
country in violation of federal law is not a 'constitutional
irrelevancy.' ",126 The Court, however, applied a heightened
rational basis test, by requiring the state to show that it had a
"substantial"-as opposed to a legitimate-interest in excluding
the children of illegal aliens from education, resulting in the
statute being held unconstitutional. 127  The reason for this
variation on rational basis review was the "special constitutional
sensitivity presented by [the case] ' "12' namely that the statute
penalized innocent children for their parents' faults. 129
119 Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
120 Id. at 292-93, 296.
121 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
122 Id. at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 Foley, 435 U.S. at 296; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1973).
124 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
125 Id. at 230.
126 Id. at 223.
127 Id. at 230.
121 Id. at 226.
129 Id. at 220.
2014]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Thus, Supreme Court precedent suggests that there may be
exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny if the statute
either excludes aliens from a position that should be reserved for
citizens or excludes aliens whose status is not a "constitutional
irrelevancy."
Whether statutes that exclude nonimmigrants, but not
LPRs, fit within one of these exceptions has yet to be determined
by the Supreme Court. In Toll v. Moreno,13 ° the Court addressed
a policy that excluded nonimmigrants from obtaining in-state
tuition at the University of Maryland,"' but it struck down the
policy solely on Supremacy Clause grounds 32 and did not engage
in an equal protection analysis.133
The Supreme Court has, thus, left open the questions of
whether nonimmigrants are a suspect class and whether statutes
that make classifications based on a nonimmigrant's temporary
status should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. The circuit
courts have answered these questions differently.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND NONIMMIGRANTS-THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT
In a 2005 case, LeClerc v. Webb, 34 the Fifth Circuit was the
first circuit court to address the issue of whether nonimmigrants
are a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny protection.135 It held
that nonimmigrants were not a suspect class and, instead,
130 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
131 Id. at 3.
132 Id. at 17. The Supremacy Clause argument focused on the fact that the
federal government had provided specific incentives exclusively for G-4 visa holders
to establish a domicile in the United States and that the State of Maryland had to
honor that Congressional intention. Id. The Court noted that "when Congress has
done nothing more than permit a class of aliens to enter the country temporarily, the
proper application of the principle [Supremacy Clause] is likely to be a matter of
some dispute." Id. at 13. Indeed, it has been the subject of dispute between the
LeClere and Dandmudi courts, with the former saying the Supremacy Clause does
not apply to statutes that exclude nonimmigrants from professional licenses, LeClerc
v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 423 (5th Cir. 2005), and the latter suggesting that it would
apply, but decided the case on equal protection grounds, Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686
F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2012). This Note does not address the Supremacy Clause issues.
133 Toll, 458 U.S. at 9-10.
134 419 F.3d 405.
131 See Ariel Subourne, Alienage as a Suspect Class: Nonimmigrants and the
Equal Protection Clause 2 (Jan. 1, 2014) (unpublished article) (on file with the Seton
Hall Law eRepository), available at http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1146&context=student scholarship; see also id. at 2 n.9.
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applied rational basis review.13 The Sixth Circuit was the next
circuit court to address this issue, doing so in the 2007 case
entitled League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v.
Bredesen.37 It largely deferred to the Fifth Circuit's rationale
and also applied rational basis review. 38 In 2011, the Fifth
Circuit, in Van Staden v. St. Martin,39  reaffirmed its
commitment to LeClerc. 4 ° The Second Circuit, in Dandamudi v.
Tisch,"' a 2012 case, disagreed with both circuit courts and
applied strict scrutiny protection to nonimmigrants. 4 2 This Part
examines the different approaches to this issue.
A. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits'App roach
The Fifth Circuit first examined the application of equal
protection to nonimmigrants in LeClerc v. Webb. 43 The statute
at issue, Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 3(B), required
"[e]very applicant for admission to the [Louisiana] Bar... [b]e a
citizen of the United States or a resident alien thereof." '144 At the
time of suit, all of the plaintiffs had nonimmigrant status: two of
the plaintiffs were in the United States on H-1B temporary
worker visas while the other two were on J-1 student visas.14 All
of the plaintiffs argued that nonimmigrants should be considered
a suspect class and therefore, state laws affecting them should be
subject to strict scrutiny review.14
The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held that Louisiana
Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 3(B) was subject to rational basis
review. 47 First, the court noted that the Supreme Court had
only applied strict scrutiny to classifications involving LPRs. 48
The court examined distinctions between resident aliens and
nonimmigrants to justify its conclusion that nonimmigrant
aliens, unlike LPRs, are not a "'discrete' or 'insular'" class
136 LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415.
137 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007).
13s Id. at 533.
139 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 110 (2012) (mem.).
140 Id. at 58 ("This case is controlled by LeClerc ... .
141 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012).
142 Id. at 75, 77.
143 See Subourne, supra note 135.
144 LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2005).
141 Id. at 410-11.
146 Id. at 415.
147 Id.
14s Id. at 416.
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entitled to have statutes affecting them reviewed under strict
scrutiny.149  These distinctions included the fact that
"nonimmigrant aliens may not serve in the U.S. military, are
subject to strict employment restrictions, incur differential tax
treatment, and may be denied federal welfare benefits."'1
Nonimmigrants also stipulate, as a condition of their admission
to the United States, that they have "'no intention of
abandoning' their countries of origin and do not intend to seek
permanent residence in the United States."1 1 Thus, the court
concluded that "although aliens are a suspect class in general,
they are not homogeneous and precedent does not support the
proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class entitled
to have state legislative classifications concerning them subjected
to strict scrutiny."5 2
Regarding intermediate scrutiny, the court held that there
was no precedential basis for applying this level of scrutiny to
alienage classifications. 3 It viewed intermediate scrutiny as a
level of analysis that the Supreme Court has reserved for gender
classifications. 15
4
The court, thus, applied rational basis review to the
Louisiana statute, asking whether the classification had "some
fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.15 Louisiana's
legitimate public purpose, according to the court, was its
"substantial interest in regulating the practice of those it admits
to its bar. '15'  The court concluded that this interest is rationally
related to the statute's classification because nonimmigrants are
allegedly more transient than their resident counterparts, due to
their easily terminable status.15 7  Because of this transient
propensity, nonimmigrants could be more difficult to locate,
making it harder to subject them to the Louisiana Bar's
regulations.1 58  Enforcing such regulations would be especially
149 Id. at 417-19 ("Nonimmigrant aliens, in short, do not warrant Carolene
Products status.").
15. Id. at 419 (footnotes omitted).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 419-20.
154 See id. at 420.
155 Id.
151 Id. at 421.
157 Id.
158 Id.
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difficult if a malfeasant or nonfeasant nonimmigrant attorney
were deported to his country of origin, after his visa expired,
where there is no international reciprocity enabling the
Louisiana Bar to reach him.1"9  Thus, under the highly
deferential nature of rational basis review, the court upheld
Louisiana's statute. 16 0
In Van Staden v. St. Martin,61 the Fifth Circuit affirmed its
commitment to LeClerc and upheld a Louisiana statute that
required either U.S. citizenship or LPR status to obtain a nursing
license by reviewing the statute under LeClerc's rational basis
standard.16 2  It regarded LeClerc as controlling authority that
"draws a clean line between permanent resident aliens and
nonimmigrant aliens," with the former being a suspect class and
the latter a non-suspect class.16 3  The Van Staden court went
further than LeClerc by holding that a "legislature may
rationally deem nonimmigrants as categorically more transient.
Even if... they are LPR applicants and thus signal their
willingness to reside here permanently, nonimmigrants have not
been vetted by [the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services] ."164 Because of this transient characteristic, a state
may not be able to enforce its disciplinary controls over
nonimmigrants and may therefore rationally exclude them from
certain professions.1 6 1
In League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v.
Bredesen,GG the Sixth Circuit, after applying rational basis
review, upheld a Tennessee statute that conditions the issuance
of a driver license on either U.S. citizenship or LPR status.6 7
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the LeClerc court's analysis,
finding that "[t]here are abundant good reasons, both legal and
pragmatic, why lawful permanent residents are the only subclass
159 Id.
160 Id. at 422 (finding that statute survives rational basis review and, thus, does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause). The court also dispensed with every other
constitutional attack on the statute, holding that the statute violated neither the
Supremacy Clause nor the Due Process Clause. Id. at 423-26.
161 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 110 (2012) (mem.).
162 Id. at 57-59, 61.
163 Id. at 58-60.
164 Id. at 61.
165 Id.
166 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007).
167 Id. at 526, 537. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs other constitutional
challenge to the statute: that it violated the plaintiffs right to travel. Id. at 537.
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of aliens who have been treated as a suspect class." '  These
"good reasons" included the same factual distinctions between
permanent residents and nonimmigrants as those articulated by
the LeClerc court.1"9 The LULAC court concluded that these
factual differences are the most important factors for
distinguishing cases like LeClerc and LULAC, where the statute
at issue only classifies against nonimmigrants, from precedent
that reviews alienage classifications under strict scrutiny. 70
B. The Second Circuit's Approach
The Second Circuit, in Dandamudi v. Tisch, 7 ' applied strict
scrutiny to a statute that excluded nonimmigrants from
becoming pharmacists, finding the statute unconstitutional. 72
The Dandamudi court held that "the Supreme Court has
repeatedly affirmed the general principle that alienage is a
suspect classification and has only ever created two exceptions to
that view. We decline to create a third [exception for
nonimmigrants] .... "173 The first exception is the governmental
functions exception articulated by the Court in Foley v.
Connelie,74 which "allows states to exclude aliens from political
and governmental functions as long as the exclusion satisfies a
rational basis review." 75  The second exception, articulated by
the Court in Plyler v. Doe,"'6 "allows states broader latitude to
deny opportunities and benefits to undocumented aliens.1 77
Nonimmigrants fit within neither exception according to the
Second Circuit. 178
1"s Id. at 533.
169 Id.
17' See id. at 532 ("Still, it is the district court's third basis for distinguishing
Nyquist that is most important. In Nyquist, the plaintiffs were lawful permanent
resident aliens who were subject to discriminatory harm and were treated as
members of a suspect class. The reason this is critical is well explained in LeClerc v.
Webb."); see also id. at 533.
171 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012).
172 Id. at 69-70. New York Education Law § 6805(1)(6) provides that only U.S.
citizens or LPRs are eligible to obtain a pharmacist license in New York. See id. at
69.
173 Id. at 72.
174 435 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1978).
17' Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 73.
176 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982).
177 Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 74.
17s See id.
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The Second Circuit stated three reasons for not recognizing a
third exception, articulated by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, that
would exclude nonimmigrants from a suspect classification. 179
First, although the Graham Court listed factual similarities
between aliens and citizens, such as paying taxes and being
called into the armed forces, those factual similarities were not
intended to be a test for determining when state discrimination
against one subclass of aliens is subject to strict scrutiny.18 °
Second, because the Supreme Court labeled aliens as a "discrete
and insular minority," due to "their limited role in the political
process," it makes sense to consider nonimmigrants as a "discrete
and insular minority" as well, considering the fact that
nonimmigrants are likely even "more powerless and vulnerable
to state predations" than LPRs. 81 Third, even if Supreme Court
precedent allowed states to distinguish based on a subclass's
similarity to citizens, strict scrutiny would still apply to
nonimmigrants because they are sufficiently similar to
citizens.1 2
The Second Circuit also disagreed with the Fifth and Sixth
Circuit claim that nonimmigrants' transience justifies their
exclusion from a suspect classification. 83 The court reasoned
that nonimmigrants are transient in name only, as many
nonimmigrants ultimately apply for and obtain LPR status.8 4
The court also pointed out that LPRs and citizens may be just as
likely as nonimmigrants to flee the state or the country to escape
disciplinary controls or malpractice actions.8 '
Because the Second Circuit found no reason to exclude
nonimmigrants from a suspect classification and because no
established exception to the general rule that all alienage
179 Id. at 75.
ISO Id. at 76 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971)).
"I Id. at 77.
112 Id. at 77-78 (noting that: (1) nonimmigrants often do pay taxes on the same
terms as citizens; (2) although it is true that nonimmigrants must indicate an intent
not to remain in the country, under the dual intent doctrine, they may also express
an intent to remain in the United States. permanently; (3) a nonimmigrant's limited
work permission is wholly irrelevant where the state seeks to prohibit aliens from
working in the very occupation for which they were admitted into the United States.;
and (4) nonimmigrants are not necessarily any more transient than citizens or legal
permanent residents).
1S3 See id. at 78.
184 Id.
1S' Id. at 79.
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classifications are subject to strict scrutiny applied, it held that
discrimination against nonimmigrants is subject to strict
scrutiny.18 6
I1. NONIMMIGRANTS ARE NOT A SUSPECT CLASS
Nonimmigrants are not a suspect class because they are not
discriminated against based on any conspicuous, immutable
characteristic and therefore they do not face any invidious
discrimination.1 7 The Supreme Court's declaration that alienage
classifications are inherently suspect should not be applied
outside of the context in which it was first announced88 : one in
which aliens were being excluded based on an immutable
characteristic that did not affect their ability to participate in
society.8 9 Historically, these exclusions were motivated by racist
or xenophobic animus. 9 ' Thus, the original purpose of making
aliens a suspect class was to protect them from such animus,
which is also referred to as invidious discrimination. 91 Where
such a purpose is not present, the Supreme Court has not
adhered to the declaration that aliens are a suspect class. 92
Thus, where nonimmigrants do not face invidious discrimination,
but are excluded for a legitimate purpose, courts should not treat
them as a suspect class. Because the nonimmigrants in LeClerc,
LULAC, and Dandamudi did not face invidious discrimination,93
they should not be entitled to strict scrutiny protection; instead,
they should be subjected to rational basis review.
The first Section of this Part shows that aliens are only a
suspect class if they face invidious discrimination. The second
Section shows how nonimmigrants do not face any such
discrimination but, rather, are excluded for legitimate reasons.
186 See id. at 78-79.
187 See infra Part III.B.
188 See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
189 See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
191 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
12 See supra Part I.C.
193 See infra notes 220, 227-28, 230-31 and accompanying text.
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A. Aliens Are Only a Suspect Class When Faced with Invidious
Discrimination Based on an Immutable Characteristic
In Graham, the Supreme Court held that classifications
based on race, nationality, and alienage are inherently suspect
and are thus subject to strict scrutiny. 194 The common factor
among these groups is that they all have been the source for
some irrational, "deep-seated prejudice, '195 such as xenophobia or
racism, that was based on some conspicuous and immutable
characteristic, like skin color, that defined them as a class. 96
This kind of discrimination is known as "invidious"
discrimination. 97 The abolishment of this kind of invidious
discrimination is the purpose of applying strict scrutiny
automatically to classifications based on race, nationality, or
alienage. 98  Because nonimmigrants' distinguishing
characteristic, the possession of a temporary visa, is not a
conspicuous, obvious, or immutable characteristic, this purpose of
applying strict scrutiny is absent. Therefore, the fact that the
Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to statutes that
classify against aliens generally does not mean that strict
scrutiny must apply to subgroups of aliens who have not been
subject to xenophobic discrimination and whose defining
characteristic is the inconspicuous status conferred on them by
the federal government.
This view of suspect classes and the application of strict
scrutiny is supported by the cases relied on by the Graham Court
in labeling alienage classifications as inherently suspect. 99 For
example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, one of the cases the Graham
Court cited, °° the Court held that San Francisco's discrimination
against "Chinese subjects" violated the Equal Protection Clause
because "no reason for [the discrimination] exist[ed] except
hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners
194 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
19 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
19 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
197 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
19S Id. at 213 ("The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less
than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation."); see also
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) ("[A] State may not accomplish such
a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.").
199 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72 (relying on Yick Wo and Takahashi for
establishing aliens as a suspect class).
211 Id. at 371.
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belong."2 °1  Thus, in Yick Wo, racist and xenophobic
considerations fueled the city's discrimination, prompting the
Court to find a violation of equal protection. °2
Another case relied upon by the Graham Court is Takahashi
v. Fish and Game Commission. °3 In that case, the legislative
history of the statute explicitly showed that the statute's goal
was to target Japanese aliens for discrimination.0 4 Justice
Murphy and Justice Rutledge said, in their concurrence, that
"[t]he statute in question is but one more manifestation of the
anti-Japanese fever which has been evident in California in
varying degrees since the turn of the century. '205 These Justices
also said that "protagonists of intolerance" had engaged in a
"long campaign to undermine the reputation of persons of
Japanese background and to discourage their residence in
California. '20  Thus, it was quite apparent that the California
statute was motivated by racism and xenophobia. Consequently,
the statute was held to be an unconstitutional violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.20 7
In Graham, there were fewer overt racist or xenophobic
motivations behind the statute at issue. 2° ' The Court struck
down statutes that conditioned the qualification for welfare
benefits on either U.S. citizenship or residing in the state for
fifteen years because aliens and citizens contributed equally to
the tax revenues that supported those welfare benefits. 209  The
Court reasoned that because aliens and citizens contribute
equally to the tax revenues for benefits, any unexplained
statutory distinctions between aliens and citizens regarding the
receipt of benefits is an invidious distinction. Because neither
Pennsylvania nor Arizona provided a reason for excluding aliens
from welfare benefits, the Court held that the statutes were
21 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366, 374 (1886).
202 Id. at 374.
203 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
204 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
211 Id. at 422 (Murphy, J., concurring).
201 Id. at 423.
207 See id. at 420-22 (majority opinion).
211 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 367-68 (reasoning that, on their face, the statutes
at issue did not make any classifications based on race and, unlike the cases in Yick
Wo and Takahashi, the implementation of the statutes was not targeted at a
particular race of foreigners).
209 Id. at 367-68, 376.
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unconstitutional violations of the Equal Protection Clause.210
Thus the Court inferred a racist or xenophobic motivation for the
distinction, given the absence of an otherwise legitimate purpose
for excluding the aliens from welfare benefits,211 which is similar
to the method employed by the Yick Wo Court in finding such
motivations .212
The race, alienage, and nationality of the petitioners in both
Yick Wo and Takahashi were easily discernible from their
appearance. The petitioners could not hide the characteristics
that set them apart from others and made them subject to
baseless and intolerant discrimination. Because they are victims
of discrimination that focuses on nothing that affects their ability
to participate in society, they are entitled to a suspect
classification. A white male from the United Kingdom, studying
in the United States on a J-1 visa, is not similarly situated to the
petitioners in Yick Wo and Takahashi because he is not
considered an outsider and has not been subject to a history of
purposeful discrimination and therefore does not need the same
level of protection.
Where there are no racist or xenophobic motivations, the
Court has not applied strict scrutiny to classifications based on
alienage.213 In Foley v. Connelie,214 the Court said that "[i]t would
be inappropriate ... to require every statutory exclusion of aliens
to clear the high hurdle of 'strict scrutiny.' "215 The Foley Court
found that there was no invidious discriminatory motivation for
New York's exclusion of aliens from being appointed to the New
York State police force.21" The motivation for the exclusion in
that case, rather, was to ensure that a democratic society is ruled
by its people and that the basic conception of a political
community is preserved. 217  Having found no reason for strict
scrutiny protection, the Court applied rational basis review and
held the statute constitutional.218
211 Id. at 374-76.
211 Id. at 374-75.
212 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
213 See supra Part I.C.
214 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
211 Id. at 295.
216 Id. at 296.
217 Id.
21s See id. at 300.
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B. Nonimmigrants Do Not Face Invidious Discrimination Based
on an Immutable Characteristic but Rather Are Excluded
from Employment and Professional Services for Legitimate
Purposes
Regarding the statutes at issue in LeClerc, LULAC, and
Dandamudi, there is no invidious motivation for excluding
nonimmigrants. The statutes welcome aliens from all over the
world, regardless of race or country of origin, to become licensed
professionals; they were not motivated by xenophobia or racism.
Moreover, in each of those circuit court cases, there was a
legitimate motivation for those statutes.219  The following
Subsections examine those legitimate motivations.
1. Louisiana's Interest in Regulating the Louisiana Bar
The LeClerc court found that the motivation behind the
statute at issue was to ensure that attorneys licensed by the
Louisiana Bar "provide continuity and accountability in legal
representation."'22 Because a nonimmigrant's ability to remain
in the United States can be forcibly terminated by the U.S.
government-for example, the visa could expire or the
government could decline to renew the visa-a nonimmigrant
attorney could be forced to leave the country against the
attorney's will, leaving the client with no representation and,
most likely, no recourse against the attorney.221
Such a situation could put a great burden on the Louisiana
justice system. For example, a nonimmigrant attorney who has
been in the United States for one year on an H-1B visa decides to
help out with Louisiana's indigent defense shortage and takes on
a criminal defendant.222 The defendant's case turns out to be
particularly complex and is going into its second year when,
suddenly, the nonimmigrant attorney is deported because his
visa expired. The criminal defendant would then have a claim
219 See infra Part IJ.B.1-3.
220 LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005).
221 Id.
222 The Harvard Law Review, in criticizing the LeClerc court, suggests that
nonimmigrant attorneys could provide legal aid to indigent criminal defendants. See
Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Fifth Circuit Holds That
Louisiana Can Prevent Nonimmigrant Aliens from Sitting for the Bar.-LeClerc v.
Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 669, 675 (2005).
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for ineffective assistance of counsel, and the court would have to
re-try the entire case. This repetitive trying of cases places a
great cost on the judiciary.223
Even if the nonimmigrant attorney had extended his H-1B
visa, the attorney's stay is limited to six years.224 It is certainly
possible that a criminal defendant's case could last more than six
years and that the sudden departure would still likely result in a
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Thus, the LeClerc court was correct in treating this
motivation as legitimate because it does not seek to exclude
nonimmigrants for racist or xenophobic purposes but rather for
protecting clients and the taxpayer from undue burdens on their
justice system.
This situation in LeClerc is distinct from that in In re
Griffiths in which the Supreme Court struck down a rule that
denied admission to the Connecticut Bar to all aliens, permanent
residents, and nonimmigrants alike.225 Permanent residents,
unlike nonimmigrants, can stay in this country indefinitely and
are not subject to the forced departure to which nonimmigrants
are subjected. 22' Therefore, there is no legitimate distinction
between a permanent resident attorney and a U.S. citizen
attorney, and they do not expose their clients or the justice
system to the same types of risks and costs posed by
nonimmigrant attorneys. Thus, excluding permanent residents
from the bar requires an invidious distinction, since there is no
other explanation, while excluding nonimmigrants does not.
223 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379 (1986) (holding that the State
must bear the cost of ineffective assistance of counsel claims); see also Anne M.
Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform,
and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1134 (1999)
(citing an ABA opinion that describes the remands for ineffective assistance of
counsel as "costly").
224 Assuming the nonimmigrant has not had an application for permanent
residency or labor certification pending for more than one year. Even if that was the
case, he or she would only be eligible for a one year extension. See American
Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313,
§ 104(c), 114 Stat. 1251 (2000) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (West
2013)); id. § 106(a); see also Richard Steel, Temoporary Workers-H-1B, H-1C and
TN Status, in STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 3:14 (2013 ed.). Even if that was the
case, he would only be eligible for a one year extension.
221 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
22' Richard Steel, Generally, in STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 10:1 (2013 ed.).
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2. Tennessee's Administrative Interest
Tennessee's exclusion of nonimmigrants and illegal aliens
from the issuance of a driver license was not motivated by
invidious discriminatory intent.227 It is difficult to infer that
there was invidious intent in excluding a group of people, where
such exclusion resulted in no harm to the excluded class. Under
the statute addressed in LULAC, nonimmigrants could drive as
freely as any U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident that
possessed a driver's license. 228  Nonimmigrants were merely
given a different document solely to reflect their different
immigration status in that their driving certificate expired on the
same date as their visas. 229 This is no different than the fact that
permanent residents and nonimmigrants possess different
immigration documentation from the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services. The different documentation serves
merely administrative purposes and creates no harm for any
party involved. Therefore, the statute is not a product of
invidious discrimination.
3. New York's Interest in Regulating Health Care Services
New York's exclusion of nonimmigrants from becoming
licensed pharmacists, the issue in Dandamudi, was motivated
not by invidious animus but by a desire to protect patients.2
Similar to the risk posed by nonimmigrant lawyers to clients,
patients of nonimmigrant pharmacists could be harmed by the
sudden, forced departure of their pharmacists caused by a failure
to renew their visas or a denial of their renewal requests. For
example, many patients take a variety of medications. Some of
227 Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2012).
22' League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d
523, 532 (6th Cir. 2007).
229 Brief of Appellees at 31, League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v.
Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-5306), 2006 WL 4389690 ("[T]he
State decided to issue to them the certificates for driving that expire on the same
date as their visas.").
230 686 F.3d at 69.
231 Reply Brief for Appellants, Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012)
(No. 10-4397-cv.), 2011 WL 2612826, at *14 ("But § 6805(1)(6) represents no
judgment as to the likelihood that any individual applicant will violate the State's
disciplinary rules and flee the country; rather, it reflects a general policy to protect
the health and safety of its residents by encouraging compliance with disciplinary
rules and increasing the likelihood that adequate remedies will be available if
pharmacists do violate those rules.").
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these medications cannot be taken together. A patient's regular
pharmacist keeps track of all these medications to make sure
that they are administered safely to the patient. 2  If a patient's
regular pharmacist is suddenly forced to leave because of the
expiration of the pharmacist's visa, then the patient is exposed to
the risk of taking medications improperly. This risk is especially
high if the patient is prescribed a new medication that cannot be
taken with the patient's current medication because the patient's
new pharmacist may not know about the patient's current
medication. 233 Such risks result in 1.5 million medication-related
adverse events every year in the United States, costing more
than $177 billion in terms of medication-related morbidity and
mortality. 234 Thus the exclusion of nonimmigrants is based on
protecting patients, not on a racist or xenophobic desire to rid the
profession of aliens.
The foregoing Subsections show that excluding
nonimmigrants from professional licenses is not invidious
discrimination. Professionals have people that depend on them
and expect continuity of service. A nonimmigrant's terminable
status undermines this expectation. Thus, in order to serve the
expectation of clients and patients, a state may rationally and
legitimately exclude nonimmigrants from professional services.
The Dandamudi court contends, however, that, in practice,
there is little distinction between permanent resident
professionals and nonimmigrant professionals because the latter
ultimately apply for and obtain permanent residency.23 This
232 See AM. PHARMACISTS ASS'N & THE NAT'L ASS'N OF CHAIN DRUG STORES
FOUND., MEDICATION THERAPY MANAGEMENT IN PHARMACY PRACTICE: CORE
ELEMENTS OF AN MTM SERVICE MODEL 3-4 (March 2008), available at
https://www.accp.com/docs/
positions/misc/CoreElements.pdf [hereinafter AM. PHARMACISTS ASS'N] (describing
pharmacist ability to prevent adverse health events related to improper medication
administration by overseeing a patient's medication intake).
233 For example, many senior citizens have a plethora of doctors. If a senior
citizen is currently on medication prescribed by her neurologist and another
medication prescribed by her primary care physician, the nonimmigrant pharmacist
would check to make sure she takes the medication appropriately. If the
nonimmigrant pharmacist is deported, and the senior citizen fills a new medication
prescribed by her cardiologist with a new pharmacist, that new pharmacist may not
know about the medication from the neurologist and the primary physician. If the
cardiologists' medication cannot be taken with the other medication, the patient is at
severe risk of harm.
234 AM. PHARMACISTS ASS'N, supra note 232, at 3.
23 Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 78.
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contention presumes that obtaining permanent residency is a
sure thing, a mere formality. It is not.236  The INA contains
detailed conditions of eligibility for such adjustment of status.237
Nonimmigrants must have their employer file a petition on their
behalf and demonstrate that they meet the criteria set forth in
the regulations. 23' They must be cleared by the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services after a thorough vetting process.239
Even if a nonimmigrant meets these criteria, only a limited
number of aliens may adjust to permanent resident status each
year.240 Thus, it is not certain that nonimmigrants will obtain
permanent status, leaving clients and patients at risk.
Moreover, while the policy of attracting the best and
brightest professionals from all over the world by giving them
visas is noteworthy, a state may rationally prefer the policy of
protecting their citizens from the consequences of a
nonimmigrant professional's terminable status.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court declared that alienage
classifications are inherently suspect, it did so by comparing such
classifications to racial classifications. The comparison is
warranted because many legislatures used alienage
classifications to disguise their racist and intolerant motivations
and escape equal protection. The comparison is also warranted
because alienage classification could be based on xenophobia,
which is, like racism, an example of irrational and deep-seated
prejudice. Xenophobia is irrational because it is not based not on
any characteristic that affects the foreigner's ability to
participate in society but merely on the fact that the foreigner is
different. Thus, by making aliens a suspect class, the Supreme
Court sought to eradicate this invidious discrimination.
Aliens can, however, possess characteristics that do affect
their ability to participate in society, justifying differential
treatment. Because nonimmigrants have terminable status in
236 See Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 231, at *23 ("While some
immigrants do succeed in obtaining LPR status, it is much more than a formality.").
237 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012)).
238 Id. at 23-24 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 (2009)).
239 See Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 59-60 (5th Cir. 2011).
24 Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 231, at *24 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-53
(2012)).
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this country, meaning that they may be compelled to leave this
country upon the expiration of their visas, they possess
characteristics that affect their ability to participate in society.
This effect is particularly true for nonimmigrants that serve in
professional capacities because the clients of those professionals
reasonably expect that their needs will be continuously served. A
legislature may, therefore, exclude nonimmigrants from being
professionals. This exclusion would not be based merely on the
fact that the nonimmigrant looks different, or some other
xenophobic reason, but on the legitimate concern about the effect
of a nonimmigrant's terminable status.
Thus, the Dandamudi court's conclusion that nonimmigrants
are a suspect class because aliens are a suspect class is wrong. It
disregards the purpose of making aliens a suspect class and the
serious consequences of a nonimmigrant's terminable status.

